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Abstract
We study long-run trends in market hours of work and employment shifts
across economic sectors driven by uneven TFP growth in market and home pro-
duction. We focus on the substitutions between market and home production and
on the structural transformation between agriculture, manufacturing and services.
The model can rationalize the observed falling or U-shaped pattern for aggregate
hours, the complete marketization of agriculture and manufacturing, and the shift
from agriculture to services without violating balanced aggregate growth. We find
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A feature of modern economic growth is the changing trend in total hours of work.
When industrialization first takes place hours of work outside the home are likely to
increase, as more workers move to factories. Past this very early stage, total hours
typically fall, largely as a result of a fall in the mean hours of those at work. In yet
later stages of modern growth trends become less clear-cut, with no systematic overall
dynamic pattern. In the United States the trend over the last century is a shallow U-
shape, a long decline followed by a small rise. In other countries there is a monotonic
decline, although one that flattens out as growth progresses. A “stylized fact” of low-
frequency fluctuations in market hours during modern economic growth is a long-lasting
decline in mean hours per head, which eventually dissipates. Figure 1 uses data from the
website of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and shows average weekly
hours of work for the population of working age. We show data for 1960-2004 for the
United States and the biggest European economies. The main fact of a declining trend
that either slows down or reverses is evident. Even more striking is the decline in hours
before 1960, in earlier stages of modern growth. Table 1 shows this decline from 1890
to 1960.1
The changing trends in aggregate hours that one finds in long runs of data are
usually neglected by modern growth theory.2 A seemingly unrelated feature of modern
growth is structural transformation: the decline of agriculture and the rise of services,
with relatively smaller changes in industrial employment. In this paper we propose a
framework for the study of these two phenomena that builds on a common economic
cause: the response of hours of work to the uneven distribution of technological change
across production sectors located in the market and the home.3
1In the United States the initial decline due to the fall in mean hours of those at work went on
until about 1940, in most Euroepan countries until much later. The decline of agricultural employment
also generally contributes to the decline of total hours, through the withdrawal of some workers from
the labour force, especially women and children. In more recent times there has been an increase in
the labour force participation of women in all industrial countries, which increased overall hours in the
United States but not yet in the European countries, where hours per employee continued to fall. See
Durand (1975, esp. ch. 4) and Maddison (1995) for cross-country evidence and Goldin (1995) for female
labour supply in the US time series and in other countries. For the claim that in the very first stages
of industrialization hours rise see Voth (1998).
2A typical statement is the following one, due to Cooley and Prescott (1995, p.16): “In balanced-
growth consumption, investment and capital all grow at a constant rate while hours stay constant. This
behavior is consistent with the growth observations described earlier.” See also the discussion in Gali
(2005).
3Structural transformation has been studied by many authors. See Kuznets (1966) and Baumol
(1967) for early contributions and Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) and Ngai and
Pissarides (2004) for more recent work. Home production has been studied extensively in a partial
equilibrium context, starting with Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977). More recently it has been studied
in the context of equilibrium business cycles and to some extent in the context of growth (see Gronau
1997 for a survey and Parente, Rogerson and Wright 2000 and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson 2000 for
growth-related work).
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Table 1: Weekly hours of work, population of working age
Year USA France Italy UK
1890 35.9 39.7 43.4 35.4
1913 31.4 37.1 40.1 32.5
1929 27.3 32.0 32.0 26.9
1938 20.2 24.7 26.3 28.5
1960 23.8 25.1 24.2 28.5
The numbers shown are for the average weekly number of hours of market work for ages 15-64. Sources:
Maddison (1995) for total hours and Mitchell (1980) and US Historical Statistics for the working age
population.
In our model production can take place both in the market and the home. The time
allocated to market production produces both consumption and capital goods and is a
measure of the conventional supply of labour. The time allocated to home production
produces consumption goods by using capital goods purchased in the market but it is not
part of the conventional definition of labour supply. We show that because of the uneven
distribution of technological change the division of total work time between market and
home changes during the course of economic development. In our benchmark economy
these changes drive the changes in aggregate labour supply. Under plausible conditions
the time allocated to market production may increase initially, but as growth progresses
it decreases. In later stages of economic growth it increases again. The prediction of
a changing trend in the number of market hours is unique to our model: although a
variety of mechanisms can yield a fall in market hours during economic growth, such as
a rise in the returns to education or a rise in the demand for leisure, to our knowledge
no model has been able to explain the turning point in market hours that we get from
the substitutions between home and market production.
The intuition behind our results derives from the key assumption that although mar-
ket activities at the disaggregation level of agriculture, manufacturing and services pro-
duce goods that are poor substitutes for each other, home production produces mainly
goods that are close substitutes for goods produced in the market. Our utility function
is defined over three composite goods, respectively corresponding to agricultural, man-
ufacturing and service goods. Each composite is a basket of two goods, one of which
is produced in the market and the other in the home. At the level of the composite
goods employment is moving from agriculture and (eventually) manufacturing towards
services, a process known as structural transformation. The reason is technology: be-
cause composite goods are poor substitutes for each other, employment moves to the
sector with lowest TFP growth. But within each composite production is moving from
the home to the market, a process that we call the marketization of home production.
The reason for marketization is that TFP growth in the market is at least as high as
TFP growth in the home, and given the high substitutability between the market- and
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home-produced goods, production eﬃciency requires that work be transferred from the
home to the market.
Combining the structural transformation and marketization forces we find that the
home components of agricultural and manufacturing production, such as the cultivation
of one’s own food and the making of one’s own clothes, lose hours fast over time because
both forces work against them. In contrast, the home component of services, such as
cooking and shopping, gain hours because of the structural transformation in favour of
total services, but lose them because of marketization. The tension between these two
forces drives the dynamics of overall market hours. It explains why home production of
agricultural and manufacturing goods disappears quickly and why the home production
of services may rise at first but fall later. Crucially for our purposes, it explains why early
on market hours may rise - as the home production of agriculture and manufacturing is
marketized; then they fall - as the structural transformation in favour of services moves
production to the home; and finally may rise again - as the home production of services
is marketized.
We summarize US historical evidence that shows that the home production of agri-
cultural and manufacturing goods practically disappeared in the first quarter of the
20th century. When this happened there was still a lot of employment in agriculture, so
there was still a large movement of labour from agriculture to services. As agricultural
employment declined, the hours of work allocated to the home production of services
increased, albeit less than the increase in the hours allocated to the market production
of services, which also benefited from marketization. Examples of home production that
gained hours include cleaning, household administration, shopping and child care (see
section 1 for historical evidence). But eventually, as agricultural employment shrank
and the home service production sector grew, the marketization force became larger and
dominated the structural transformation force, bringing a fall in the size of the home
production sector. This process can explain an inverted U-shape for home production
hours and reflecting this, a U-shape for market hours. If, for reasons not specified in
our model, initially women are more likely to engage in home production than men are,
these dynamic patterns can explain the fall in male hours of work in the first half of the
century and the rise in female employment in the second.
In our benchmark model we make the conventional assumption that non-work time
(i.e., all time other than the hours allocated to market or home production) enters the
utility function directly, and our utility function is such that in growth equilibrium non-
work time is constant. During periods of transition to an aggregate balanced-growth
equilibrium - following for example war or some other major event that disturbs the
initial growth equilibrium - changes in non-work time also contribute to changes in
aggregate labour supply, but these periods cannot explain the long swings in labour
supply that is the topic of this paper. We report calibrations with the steady state of
our model which show that in the United States at least, substitutions between market
sectors and between the market and the home can explain virtually all of the dynamics
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of sectoral employment shares and a significant part of the dynamics of market hours.
In an extension, however, we show how the model can yield a rising leisure time
even when the economy is on a balanced growth path. The reason for pursuing this
extension is that the substitutions between market and home do not explain the entire
evolution in aggregate market hours, and it is plausible that some part of the big fall
in hours of market work that has taken place since the beginning of the 20th century
was matched by rising leisure. The idea behind this extension is to divide leisure time
into two components, one that is the pure enjoyment of time, as in conventional theory,
and one that is enjoyment of time obtained with the help of some capital input. In
the first group there are activities like spending time with friends or playing with one’s
children. In the second there are activities like watching TV and surfing the net. The
key diﬀerence between the second leisure component and home production is that home
production produces goods that have close substitutes in the market, whereas leisure
production has no close market substitutes. One cannot outsource TV watching time.
We show that the extended model implies a rising “leisure production time,” which gives
a rising overall leisure time. Consequently, market hours either fall faster or rise less
than in our benchmark model.
Ramey and Francis (2006) recently compiled US time series data for hours allocated
to market production, home production and education since 1900. Consistent with our
model predictions, they find a negative correlation between market hours and home
hours.4 With the help of more recent time use surveys, Freeman and Schettkat (2005)
also find negative correlations between market hours and home hours for individuals,
whereas Robinson and Godbey (1997) and Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find evidence of
rising leisure. Our explanation of the recent rise in labour supply is consistent with
this set of findings. It is, however, diﬀerent from the one put forward by Greenwood,
Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005). Greenwood et al. argue that labour supply increased
because of substitutions from labour to capital in the home, following a fall in the
price of durable goods. In our model the price of durable goods also falls because of
higher TFP growth in manufacturing than in services, but the substitution of capital
for labour is not the driving force for the decline in home production time. The driving
force is the marketization that takes place because similar goods can be produced more
eﬃciently in the market (see also Rogerson, 2004, for a similar argument). Of course, the
two explanations are not mutually exclusive. An example from Freeman and Schettkat
(2005) that is consistent with our explanation is the observation that in the United States
people consume more restaurant food than in Europe, where more food is prepared at
home.5
4They also find a negative correlation between market hours and education, given that their sample
includes very young workers. We do not attempt to say anything about the rise in education in this
paper.
5A full test of the merits of each hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. Two potential tests
are (1) a detailed examination of the relation between the introduction of household appliances and the
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Section 1 examines some of the history of home production in the United States
and discusses what types of goods are produced at home. Section 2 describes in detail
our benchmark model, paying particular attention to the marketization and structural
transformation forces that shape the dynamics of hours. Section 3 discusses empirical
implications and a numerical calibration based on US data on sectoral employment shares
and aggregate market hours. Section 4 discusses an extension with a richer leisure model
that gives more general results about the dynamic behaviour of aggregate labour supply.
1 What goods are produced at home?
Home production is defined as time spent on the production of goods and services,
usually at home but sometimes outside, for one’s own use. Two important properties
of home production that distinguish it from leisure are (a) the individual derives utility
from the output of home production but not from the time that she spends on it, and
(b) home production can be “marketized”, i.e., someone else can be paid to do it and the
individual can still derive the same utility from its output. In contrast, leisure cannot
be marketized, the individual has to spend the time herself to enjoy it.
It is important for our modelling that we know the relation between the goods pro-
duced at home and the goods produced in the market. The recent literature has focused
mainly on aggregate models with one market good and one home-produced good, and
argued convincingly that the two aggregates are close substitutes for each other.6 Here
we have three market goods, agricultural goods, manufactures and services. How are
home-produced goods related to each one of these? The early literature on home pro-
duction was concerned with these issues, and a lot of useful information can be obtained
from it.7
Obvious home production activities are cleaning, cooking and child care. In the
early stages of economic development people also grew their own crops, kept small farm
animals, made clothes and preserved food (Leeds 1917, Reid 1934). The crops grown
at home were close substitutes for the output of the agricultural sector, and the clothes
and food preservation were substitutes for manufacturing goods. There is overwhelming
evidence, however, that in modern industrial societies virtually all home production
decline of paid domestic help. Were household appliances “engines of liberation” for the housewife or
“engines of job destruction” for low skilled domestic labour? (2) A detailed examination of the behaviour
of wages. In a decentralized economy our model would predict that women leave home production and
join market production because female wages are rising. In the Greenwood et al. explanation the
increased eﬃciency of home production releases time, which is now supplied to the market, so the
impact should be from the increased supply of female labour to wages.
6The most commonly used substitution elasticities between the two are in the range 1.5-2.3. See Ru-
pert, Rogerson andWright (1995), McGrattan, Rogerson andWright (1997), and Chang and Schorfheide
(2003).
7See among others, Leeds (1917), Reid (1934), Vanek (1973) and Lebergott (1993).
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produces goods that can only be classified as services. These activities include shopping,
looking after children and other relatives and administration (keeping bank accounts,
dealing with bills, etc.).
Contemporary writers argue convincingly that with urbanization home-grown crops
and rearing of small animals for food disappeared as home economic activities, even
for those who worked on the farms. Of course, it would be unreasonable to argue that
farm owners and farm workers do not consume any of their own products. But these
products are grown for the market and are not the output of home production. In the
statistics on farm employment the time devoted to growing this component of own food
consumption is counted as market work, and the most data-consistent way to interpret
the consumption of crops by those employed on the farms is as payment in kind.8
The home production of manufacturing goods was also overtaken by modern man-
ufacturing technology early on in the industrialization process. Reid (1934 p.45) made
the point forcefully: “After 1800 economic conditions changed rapidly. Roads improved
steadily. Trade increased. Modern inventions made the most eﬃcient tools too expen-
sive for small-scale household use. Steam power possible only for centralized industries
brought about the withdrawal of much manufacturing from the home.” Some home man-
ufacturing activities, however, survived into the twentieth century. Leeds (1917) writes
that in his sample of 60 families in Pennsylvania, most families reported 2 to 3 hours
a week making clothes for their own use. Although this included the work of paid do-
mestic helpers, this was also an activity undertaken by the housewife.9 But seventeen
years later, Reid (1934, p.47) summarized as follows the then-state of household pro-
duction: “As time went on, one form of production after another, spinning, weaving, ...
and other [manufacturing] tasks have wholly or in part been transferred to commercial
production. In addition, child care, education, and the care of the sick are now to a
large extent carried on by paid workers.” In similar vein, Lebergott (1993, p.60) writes
about the advent of “consumerism”, by quoting a 1932 paper by Viva Belle Boothe, as
arguing that “modern industrial processes have robbed the home of almost every ves-
tige of its former economic function.” Lebergott continued by noting that the remaining
8See Historical Statistics of the United States, Chapter D on labour: “Employed persons comprise:
(a) all those who, during the survey week, worked at all as paid employee, in their own business or
profession or on their own farm.” Reid (1934, p. 48-51) argues that in the United States growing food
specifically for own consumption disappeared as early as the 1920s. In the 1930 census of agriculture,
the average proportion of total farm produce used by the operator’s family was 13.6%. But this was
mainly market-grown food. “Home production farms”, by which we mean small holdings that the
owners used primarily to grow their own food, amounted to a mere 8% of all farms. Reid calls these
“self-suﬃcing farms” and defines them as farms that the owners consumed over 50% of output. In 1929
the average proportion of own consumption on these farms was 66.1%.
9The total weekly hours of work in the household by the “housewife and her assistants, whether
hired or members of the family” is 101.75 hours. 5.75 hours were spent on making clothes, and the rest
were spent on activities classified as services. See Leeds (1917, p.67).
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home work “consists largely of services.”10
As the home production of agricultural and manufacturing substitutes went into
decline, the home production of services increased. Mokyr (2000) writes that at the
beginning of the 20th century there was an increased demand for cleaner homes and
better-prepared food, which required more home-production time. This is consistent
with observations made by Leeds (1917, p. 70), who described approvingly the experi-
ence of “a bright young woman” in whose household “The hours given to cleaning are
few, because her house has all hard-wood floors covered with rugs; dishes are washed
only once daily (immediately after breakfast) and not wiped.” Clearly, such standards
of cleanliness became unacceptable later in the century. The types of tasks done at
home also changed over the century. Vanek (1973, p. 111) finds that “there has been a
reallocation of the tasks of household work ... a shift from maintenance and production
to managerial and interactional tasks.” Shopping is another home production service
that became increasingly prominent during the 20th century (Lebergott 1993, Robinson
and Godbey 1997).
The principal current home-production activities in the United States are shown in
Table 2. As expected, these are all activities whose products are classified as services and
which have close substitutes in the market services sector. No item in present-day time
use surveys, either in Europe or elsewhere in the industrialized world, lists an activity
that yields products that can be classified as either agricultural or manufacturing goods.
The biggest item in the American surveys is shopping, followed by caring for other
people in and out of the household (presumably children and parents or relations living
elsewhere). Moreover, although the time devoted to sub-categories changed over time,
the broad categories of activities have not changed significantly since the 1930s.
In view of the historical evidence and evidence from modern time-use surveys, a good
model of the allocation of time has to explain the reasons that home agricultural and
manufacturing production have disappeared in modern industrial societies. It also has
to explain why service production at home is surviving in such big numbers. We now
describe such a model. As anticipated by the early writers, the driver is technology.
2 A growth model with trends in hours
Our argument can be developed in a simplified model where market work takes place in
three diﬀerentiated sectors. An extension to more sectors is straightforward, at some no-
10The number of home production hours that Lebergott reports are out of line with the numbers
reported by others, most likely because of diﬀerences in the treatment of home production hours by
paid domestic assistants. As Ramey and Francis (2006) note, assistants’ hours should be part of market
hours, because they are paid for, but Lebergott included them in home production time. There is
no disagreement, however, about the type of activities performed at home and reported by Lebergott,
which is the evidence that we cite here. In our model hours by paid domestic assistants are market
hours.
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Table 2: Weekly hours of home production, American Time Use Survey
Activity Hours Activity Hours
Housework 4.23 Purchasing goods 5.67
and Services
Food preparation 3.64 Caring for household 3.83
and clean up members
Garden care 1.36 Caring for non-household 1.96
members
Household 0.95
management Total 21.64
The numbers shown are for the average weekly number of hours of home work for the population aged
15 and over for 2003 and 2004. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/tus/, Table 1.
tational cost. Agriculture and services produce only consumption goods. Manufacturing
produces the economy’s capital stock and a consumption good. Home production can
also produce three consumption goods with diﬀerentiated technologies, each of which is
a good substitute for each of the consumption goods produced in the market. Capital
goods cannot be produced in the home. Time has three uses - it can be used in market
production, in home production or in leisure.11
We derive the equilibrium as the solution to a social planning problem that maxi-
mizes the utility function of a representative agent. Equilibrium is defined as a set of
dynamic paths for the allocation of capital and time to the three market sectors, home
production and non-work time (leisure), and the allocation of the output of each sector
to consumption and capital. The utility function of the infinitely-lived representative
agent is
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [lnφ(.) + v (1− l)] dt (1)
where l ∈ (0, 1) are per capita hours of total work (market and home), v (.) is the utility
of leisure, with v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and v0 →∞ as l → 1, and φ(.) is a CES aggregate over
final consumption goods, defined by:
φ (.) =
Ã P
i=a,m,s
ωic
(ε−1)/ε
i
!ε/(ε−1)
. (2)
ci is the per capita consumption of a composite good, one each for agriculture, manu-
facturing and services, ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between these composites,
11Thus we ignore the biggest fraction of the week, which is spent on essential physiological activities,
mainly sleep, and which shows remarkable stability over time and across countries (about 70 hours).
We also ignore schooling. See Juster and Staﬀord (1991) and Robinson and Godbey (1997).
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and ωi > 0,
P
ωi = 1. The consumption composites are combinations of the output
of the market and home sectors for each good, respectively distinguished by a second
subscript, j = m,h :
ci =
h
ψic
(σi−1)/σi
im + (1− ψi)c
(σi−1)/σi
ih
iσi/(σi−1)
i = a,m, s. (3)
Here, ψi ∈ (0, 1), cij ≥ 0 ∀i, j and σi > 0. The restrictions on the utility function are
a combination of suﬃcient restrictions consistent with steady-state growth when leisure
is endogenous and there are many consumption goods, previously derived by King et al.
(1988) and Ngai and Pissarides (2004).
A key assumption is
R1 : σi > 1 > ε ∀i. (4)
It implies that market and home-produced goods are close substitutes for each other
but the agricultural, manufacturing and service goods are not close substitutes for each
other. Generally, the three composite goods are distinct goods that households want
to consume in near-constant proportions, but within each composite goods are only
marginally diﬀerentiated and larger substitutions take place. We discuss some more
evidence supporting R1 in section 3.2.
Our measure of total time is the total time available to the population who can
work. We let lij denote the time allocated to each of the six production activities. Total
market employment is
P
i lim ≡ q, which, in the absence of unemployment, is also the
conventional definition of aggregate labour supply. Market employment shares are then
defined by lim/q, for i = a,m, s. Facts about the aggregate labour supply are statements
about the evolution of q, whereas structural change refers to changes in the market
shares lim/q.
Production functions are identical in all activities except for their TFP parameters
Aij, which are Hicks-neutral:
F ij = AijF (lijkij, lij) ; A˙ij/Aij = γij i = a,m, s, j = m,h. (5)
The production function F has constant returns to scale, positive and diminishing re-
turns to inputs, and satisfies the Inada conditions; kij is the capital-labour ratio and Aij
is TFP in each sector, with growth rate γij.
All sectors produce consumption goods but only manufacturing produces capital
goods. For convenience we split manufacturing into two sub-sectors, one producing con-
sumption goods and the other producing only capital goods, with the same technology.
With some abuse of notation we distinguish by subscriptsmm the component used in the
production of consumption goods only and bymk the component used in the production
of capital goods. Because we are assuming constant-returns technologies and free factor
mobility, this is equivalent to assuming one manufacturing sector whose output can be
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either consumed or invested:
cim = Aimlimf(kim) i = a,m, s, (6)
cih = Aihlihf (kih) i = a,m, s, (7)
K˙ = Ammlmkf (kmk)− (δ + ν)K, (8)P
lij = l, i = a,m, s, j = m,h, k, (9)P
lijkij = lk, i = a,m, s, j = m,h, k; (10)
where in general f(k) ≡ F (k, 1), δ is the capital depreciation rate, ν is the population
growth rate, k is the ratio of the capital stock to hours of “total work” (the sum of market
and home hours) and K is the ratio of the aggregate capital stock to the population (so
k = K/l).
We obtain optimal allocations by maximizing the utility function in (1) subject to
(5)-(10). The maximization can be described over three layers. At the highest level,
the agent chooses a path for aggregate consumption (essentially for our composite φ),
hours of total work and the aggregate capital stock. Next, the aggregate capital stock
and total work are allocated to the production of the three consumption composites
ci (i = a,m, s) and the capital stock. And finally, the allocation to each ci is divided
between market and home production. The conditions giving the allocations in the last
two layers are “static”. We start with the lowest level, the division of the allocation to
each ci between home and market, and move to the highest.
2.1 Optimal allocations between market and home: marketi-
zation
Suppose that the agent has allocated labour li and capital per hour ki to the production
of consumption composite ci.What is the optimal allocation of these between home and
market production? To find the answer we maximize (3) separately for each i subject
to the production functions in (6) and (7) and:
li ≥ lih + lim, (11)
liki ≥ lihkih + limkim. (12)
Optimal allocations satisfy the first-order conditions
ψi
1− ψi
µ
cim
cih
¶−1/σi
=
Aih
Aim
, (13)
kim = kih. (14)
Free capital and labour mobility imply that production eﬃciency is achieved at all times
with equal capital-labour ratios between the home and the market. We can therefore
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drop the second subscript and write ki for the common capital-labour ratio in sector i
(in manufacturing it will also be optimal to have the same capital-labour ratio in the
production of capital goods, as we show below). Making use of the production functions
and (13)-(14) we obtain:
lih
lim
=
µ
1− ψi
ψi
¶σi µAim
Aih
¶1−σi
. (15)
Equation (15) contains the important “marketization” result of this paper: Because
the relative TFP levels are changing over time, the employment shares in market and
home production are also changing. By diﬀerentiation with respect to time we obtain:
l˙im
lim
− l˙ih
lih
= (σi − 1)(γim − γih). (16)
With σi > 1, and if TFP in the market sector is rising faster than in the home sector,
the home sector is losing labour to the market sector. It implies that if the TFP growth
rate of the market sector remains above the TFP growth rate of the home sector for a
suﬃciently long time, eventually the home sector will vanish and all consumption goods
will be produced in the market. This is the basis of our claims about the marketization
of all home production of agricultural and manufacturing goods. We return later in the
paper to a discussion of the conditions needed for these results and to the question of
the marketization of service production.
From (15) we obtain the share of home production in composite good i :
lih
li
=
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1
1 +
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1 . (17)
We give it here for future reference.
2.2 Optimal sectoral allocations: structural transformation
We now consider optimal allocations at the level of the composite sector. The analysis
of the preceding section enables us to implement a convenient aggregation. Making use
of (13) and (3), we derive the optimal relation between the consumption composite ci
and the part of it produced in the market:
ci = z
σi
i cim (18)
zi ≡ ψ1/(σi−1)i
"
1 +
µ
1− ψi
ψi
¶σi µAih
Aim
¶σi−1#1/(σi−1)
. (19)
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We note that zi depends only on parameters and it is a function of time because of its
dependence on the ratio of home to market TFP. Similarly, from (15) we can write the
aggregate li allocated to sector i in terms of the market allocation:
li = lim + lih = ψ
−1
i z
σi−1
i lim. (20)
Therefore, we can aggregate the production functions in (6) and (7) into one for the
composite ci :
ci = ψiziAimlif (ki) i = a,m, s. (21)
Maximization at the level of the sector takes place by maximizing φ(.) in (2) for
given l and k, with controls ci, li, ki, lmk and kmk. The constraints are (21) and as before,
(8)-(10), noting that lim + lih = li and kim = kih.
Maximization with respect to the factor inputs yields
kmk = ki = k i = a,m, s, (22)
so capital-labour ratios are common in all production activities. Maximization over the
consumption allocations yields,
φi
φj
=
ψjzjAjm
ψiziAim
i, j = a, s,m, (23)
where the notation is in general φi ≡ ∂φ/∂ci. Given the definition of φ in (2), we can
write
ci
cj
=
µ
ωiψiziAim
ωjψjzjAjm
¶ε
, (24)
and from this equation and (21) we can get:
li
lj
=
µ
ωi
ωj
¶εµψjzjAjm
ψiziAim
¶1−ε
. (25)
This equation is the basis of the structural transformation force. Traditionally, structural
transformation is discussed in the context of market hours of work only. For market hours
the equation is derived from (25) by making use of (17):
lim
ljm
=
µ
ωiψi
ωjψj
¶ε zσj−εj
z
σi−ε
i
µ
Ajm
Aim
¶1−ε
. (26)
We note that if there is no home production of goods i and j, i.e., if ψi = ψj = 1, then
zi = zj = 1, equations (25) and (26) become identical and the structural transformation
force is:
l˙i
li
− l˙j
lj
= (1− ε)(γjm − γim). (27)
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For ε < 1, sectors with fast TFP growth are losing labour to sectors with low TFP
growth, unlike the marketization force, which gives a movement in the opposite direction.
When there is home production the dynamics of zi also matter in sectoral allocations.
By diﬀerentiation of the expression for zi in (19) we obtain:
z˙i
zi
= (γih − γim)
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1
1 +
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1 (28)
= (γih − γim)
lih
li
, (29)
where use has been made of (17). Bringing now results together, by diﬀerentiating (25)
with respect to time and making use of (29), we obtain:
l˙i
li
− l˙j
lj
= (1− ε)
¡
γj − γi
¢
i, j = a,m, s. (30)
γj ≡
µ
1− ljh
lj
¶
γjm +
ljh
lj
γjh. (31)
A comparison with (27) shows that when there is a home sector the TFP growth rates
of the market sectors are replaced by the weighted average of the TFP growth rates of
the market and home sectors. It is clear from the definition of γj that we need some
quantitative restrictions on TFP growth rates to sign the direction of labour movement.
We return to this question in section 3.
We now solve for the sectoral distribution of employment and capital for given ag-
gregate l and k. From (22), capital is distributed such that capital-labour rations are
equal in all sectors. But given kmk = k, employment in the capital-producing sector
is immediately obtained by inverting the production function, since the output of the
sector is given by the assumption, made so far, that the path of the aggregate capital
stock is given. Therefore, the distribution of employment in the consumption-producing
sectors satisfies equations (25) for a given total allocation of time l − lmk. The solution
for each sector’s employment follows immediately:
li
l − lmk
=
ωεi (ψiziAim)
−1+εP
j ω
ε
j
¡
ψjzjAjm
¢−1+ε (32)
With knowledge of li the hours of work in market and home production are obtained
from (20), completing the description of equilibrium at this level.
2.3 Aggregate growth
Aggregate equilibrium is obtained by defining per capita aggregate consumption of all
goods in terms of the manufacturing market price. The objective is to aggregate up
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from the composite goods such that the utility function (1) and dynamic constraint (8)
become functions of aggregate consumption, the aggregate capital stock and non-work
time.
We first obtain the aggregate utility function. Because of the competitive allocations
that we have assumed, the price of consumption composite i in terms of the manu-
facturing market price is equal to the marginal rate of substitution φi/φmm. We define
aggregate per capita consumption as follows:
c ≡
P
i=a,m,s
µ
φi
φm
¶µ
φm
φmm
¶
ci. (33)
The first MRS is obtained from (23) and the second by diﬀerentiation of (2) and (3) and
use of (18). The relative price of composite i to the manufacturing market price that we
obtain is Amm/(ψiziAim). From (21) we then derive:
c = Ammf(k)(l − lmk). (34)
From (21) again and (32) we obtain
ci
c
=
(ωiψiziAim)
ε
Amm
P
∀j ω
ε
j
¡
ψjzjAjm
¢ε−1 . (35)
We use (35) to substitute all ci out of φ. Because φ is homogeneous of degree 1 we can
write φ = cφ˜(.), where φ˜(.) is a function of parameters (albeit changing over time).
The aggregate constraints are (34), the definition k = K/l, and (8). We substitute
(34) into (8) to obtain the single constraint that describes the evolution of the aggregate
state variable:
K˙ = Ammlf (K/l)− c− (δ + ν)K. (36)
We also define the new maximand, derived from (1) and φ(.) = cφ˜(.),
U˜ =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [ln c+ v (1− l)] dt. (37)
Aggregate equilibrium is defined as the paths of c, l and K that maximize (37) subject
to (36).
Inspection of the maximization problem shows that it has the structure of the max-
imization problem of the one-sector Ramsey economy, except for one diﬀerence: tech-
nological growth in the Ramsey economy needs to be labour-augmenting but here it
is Hicks-neutral. We therefore assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
which make the two equivalent: f(k) = kα. Under this assumption there are unique
convergent paths for c, l and K and a balanced-growth equilibrium with l constant and
c and K growing at the rate of labour-augmenting productivity growth in manufactur-
ing, γmm/(1− α). Once the equilibrium paths for the aggregates are known, the rest of
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the model is solved by working backwards through our derivations: the evolution of the
consumption composites is given by (35) and their breakdown between home and market
consumption by (18). The capital-labour ratio in all production activities is given by
k = K/l and the evolution of hours of work used in the production of capital goods
by (8). With knowledge of l and lmk, (32) gives employment in the production of each
composite good i and (17) gives its breakdown between home and market, completing
the description of equilibrium.
3 Empirical implications and other properties
3.1 Qualitative properties and aggregate facts
It is straightforward to show with standard techniques that the stationary equilibrium
of the aggregate maximization problem is saddlepath-stable. In a diagram with hours
of work on the vertical axis and capital per eﬃciency unit on the horizontal axis the
saddlepath is downward-sloping, which implies that starting with low capital, in the
adjustment to equilibrium hours of work are falling. But given our interest in long-run
trends, it is more interesting to look at the properties of steady-state equilibrium. On
the steady state hours of total work are constant. We still get changing hours of market
work which are compensated by changes in hours of home production.
There is a close relation in our model between consumption and non-work time, given
by
c
y
=
1− α
v0 (1− l) l , (38)
where y is aggregate per capita output, defined analogously to aggregate per capita
consumption, in terms of the manufacturing market price:
y = c+Ammlmkkα = Ammlkα. (39)
Since in this expression Ammkα−1 is constant in the steady state, lmk must also be
constant and y, c and k must grow at the same rate. So the following allocations are
constant in our steady state: total hours of work allocated to the production of con-
sumption goods, total hours allocated to the production of capital goods and total hours
of non-work time. But market hours are defined by q ≡
P
i lim+lmk, and so are changing
over time.
If we restrict attention to the market sector, we find that the capital-output ratio is
also constant and output per hour is growing at constant rate. The aggregate capital
stock in the market sector is given by
Kmarket =
P
i(lim + lmk)k = qk, (40)
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and so the market capital-labour ratio, Kmarket/q, is simply k. Market output is
ymarket =
P
i
µ
φim
φmm
¶
Aimkαlim +Ammkαlmk = qAmmkα (41)
and so market output per hour, ymarket/q is growing at the same constant rate as the
other aggregates. The capital-output ratio in the market economy is constant. This con-
firms our claim that our economy satisfies Kaldor’s stylized facts of aggregate balanced
growth, despite the changes in labour supply.
We now discuss some important qualitative properties of hours of work by making
the following assumptions on productivity growth rates:
R2m : γam ≥ γmm > γsm
R2h : γim ≥ γih ∀i.
R2m is consistent with the observed fact that the price of services is rising faster, and
the price of agricultural goods slower, than the price of manufacturing goods. It is
also consistent with the direct estimates of Jorgensen and Gallop (1992) for the period
1947-85 and Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) for 1959-1995. R2h is more diﬃcult to justify
with hard empirical evidence, but it can be justified on the grounds that the market
can replicate a home technology but not vice versa. Anecdotal evidence in its favour
abounds, as for example the statements by Reid (1934) and others cited in section 1 for
manufacturing.
Assumption R2h implies that over time the home production of goods should be
transferred to the market. Equation (16) shows that the marketization force is stronger
the closer substitutes home-produced goods are to market-produced goods and the bigger
the diﬀerence between their TFP growth rates. Assumption R2m and (27) imply that in
the absence of home production agriculture should be losing hours to manufacturing and
services, and manufacturing should be losing hours to services. A suﬃcient condition
that home production does not reverse the direction of structural change dictated by
the market TFP levels is that the diﬀerentials γim − γih have the same ranking as the
market TFP growth rates, which is plausible. But because the weight of the home
sector in the γj of the composites becomes progressively smaller over time through the
marketization force, there is a point after which the market TFP growth rates dominate
in the evolution of employment shares whatever the ranking of the home TFP levels.
The evidence that we examined in section 1 indicated that the home production of
agricultural goods in the United States virtually disappeared by 1930. This suggests that
home production of agricultural goods has had too small a share in overall agricultural
employment to make a diﬀerence to the structural transformation out of agriculture,
and at least since 1930 we can assume that the number of hours allocated to agricultural
home production is practically zero. Similarly, the evidence on the home production of
manufactured goods is that by 1930 it was overtaken by market production because of
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technological improvements in the market. This mechanism is precisely the one in our
model. As with agriculture, it again suggests that after industrialization, the home sector
in manufacturing became too small to make a diﬀerence in the employment reallocations
dictated by market TFP levels across sectors.
But time use surveys show substantial home production of services. Why did agricul-
tural and manufacturing home production vanish so fast and yet service home production
is surviving in such big numbers? The reason is found in the way that the marketization
and structural transformation forces combine to cause sector employment dynamics.
Looking at agriculture, we argued that it has the highest TFP growth rate, so the sec-
tor overall is losing hours at fast rate. Moreover, the output of home production and
market production are likely to be very close substitutes, and TFP in the market, be-
cause of economies of scale, is likely to be growing much faster than the TFP of food
production at home. So in agriculture both the marketization force and the structural
transformation force are strong and both work against home production, which as a
result disappears fast.
Similarly in manufacturing, the output of the home sector is likely to be a very
close substitute to the output of home production (e.g., home-made versus ready-made
clothes), and technology in the market has risen much faster than in the home after the
industrial revolution. For both these reasons, the marketization force in manufacturing
is likely to be strong. But manufacturing as a whole gains labour from agriculture, so
at least when there is a substantial agricultural sector, the structural transformation
force is not strongly against manufacturing home production. In the early stages of
industrialization there is a tension between the two forces in the home production of
manufacturing goods, the transformation out of agriculture pushing for a rise in both
market and home hours and technological improvements in the market pushing for a rise
in market hours and a fall in home hours. Eventually, however, and as the share of agri-
cultural employment shrinks, manufacturing as a whole has to lose labour to services.
So although we may not see the home production of manufacturing goods fall rapidly
at first, it should be marketized fast during the industrialization process. We argued
in section 1 that early time use surveys show some home production of manufacturing
goods in the very early part of the 20th century, when the home production of agricul-
tural goods had for practical purposes vanished. But most of the home production of
manufacturing was marketed much before the turn of the century and by 1930 it had
practically vanished.
In contrast to agriculture and manufacturing, market-produced services are not likely
to be as close a substitute for home-produced services. Whereas the outputs of agricul-
ture and manufacturing are “standardized,” service output is more diverse. For example,
child care, looking after needy relatives and shopping for one’s own clothes are not stan-
dardized activities that have very close substitutes provided by the market. Equally
importantly, because TFP growth in the production of market services is low, the mar-
ketization force for home services is weak. Opposing this weak force against home hours,
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there is a strong structural transformation force increasing hours of total work spent on
services. The net eﬀect on home-produced services is ambiguous, but if it is positive, it
is so when agriculture or manufacturing are shedding a lot of labour, which makes the
structural transformation force stronger. Eventually, when the structural transformation
force weakens through the diminishing importance of agriculture and manufacturing, the
marketization force takes over, leading to a shrinkage in the home sector. So in contrast
to home-produced food and manufacturing goods, we should observe a non-monotonic,
most likely hump-shaped path for hours of work spent on home-produced services. More-
over, the marketization of home services is weak, and so the fall in home hours in the
later stages of economic growth is likely to be slow, because of both a small substitu-
tion elasticity and small productivity-growth diﬀerentials between market and home.
Sub-sectors within services that have either no close substitutes in the market or have
practically zero TFP growth in both the market and the home, such as aspects of child
care, may never marketize completely.
Figure 2 is for the United States and shows the trends in market hours of work and in
the market employment shares of the three industrial sectors.12 Our model’s predictions
are consistent with the broad trends that we see in the figure. The evolution of the
sectoral shares is consistent with the assumptions of low substitutability between their
final products and the ranking of their TFP growth rates. Manufacturing employment
does not fall as rapidly as agricultural employment because it produces capital goods
that are needed by the expanding (market and home) service sector. More interestingly,
our model’s predictions are consistent with what we see in total market hours. In the
early part of the twentieth century the home production of all goods is still active and
the employment share of agriculture is high. Both the marketization and structural
transformation forces are strong and acting in opposite directions, so the outcome on
the evolution of market hours is ambiguous. According to our model, in this period
the home production of agriculture and manufacturing should be losing hours fast but
the home production of services should be gaining them. In the middle years, which
cover the middle two quarters of the century, the home production of agricultural and
manufacturing had practically disappeared, but the structural transformation force out
of agriculture was still strong because of the relative size of this sectors. The prediction of
our model is that the structural transformation force should dominate the marketization
of services, and so the hours allocated to the home production of services should be
rising and total hours of work falling. This is consistent with what we see in the figure.
12The series for market hours in figure 2 is not the same as the one shown in figure 1, which is for
comparable cross-country data, because of diﬀerences in coverage. The series shown in figure 2 are
due to Ramey and Francis (2006) and are more general. They include unpaid family workers, the self-
employed, government employment and commuting time (which is a constant 10 percent of the sum of
the previous three). We are grateful to Valerie Ramey for sending us these data. We divided the total
hours of market work by the population over age 10, because in the early years many children aged 10
and above worked in the market. However, our results are not aﬀected by the choice of denominator.
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But eventually the structural transformation force weakens because of the shrinkage of
agricultural employment, and the marketization of services takes over. The impact on
overall market work should be a rise in hours, especially by women, who performed the
home tasks before marketization.
3.2 Quantitative implications
Having established that under restrictions R1, R2m and R2h the broad trends in the
data are qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions, we investigate here more
closely its quantitative implications. We compare our model’s predictions with the US
time series under the assumption that the economy is on the steady state that solves
the maximization of (37) subject to (36). This restriction implies that we focus here on
substitutions between market and home production for trends in overall market hours
and on substitutions between all three goods for the sectoral allocations. How much of
the evolutions in the data can these substitutions explain?
In order to answer this question the model requires, (1) an initial allocation of hours
to the six production technologies; (2) four elasticities of substitution, ε and σi for
i = a,m, s; (3) five TFP growth diﬀerences, γam − γmm, γmm − γsm and γim − γih for
i = a,m, s; and (4) the steady-state investment rate, η, which gives the employment
share of capital production. However, as we argued in the preceding section, home
production of agricultural and manufacturing goods virtually disappeared by the late
1920s. This is important for us because the most diﬃcult data to get are the parameters
and initial distributions pertaining to home production in the early years of the century.
Another important data limitation in the earlier years is service-sector productivity. We
use relative prices to compute TFP trend diﬀerentials but a comprehensive data series
for service goods prices is available only for the period since 1929. In view of these
data limitations we trust more the performance of the model in the post-1929 period.
We focus on this period but we also make what we can of the earlier data and report
calibrations for 1900-1929.
Initial allocations. The annual series for market shares and total market hours that
we use to extract initial distributions are shown in figure 2. We obtained the initial
allocation to home production from the data provided by Ramey and Francis’s (2006).13
Ramey and Francis did not distinguish between types of activities done at home but for
the simulations beginning in 1930 we can assume that these activities were exclusively
service activities. Early studies confirm that the vast majority of activities at the turn
of the century were also service activities, but some manufacturing-type tasks and food
growing or domestic animal care were also reported. Given the data limitations, the
best we can hope for in distinguishing between diﬀerent uses of home production time in
13Because home hours in the early period may not be accurately measured, we also experimented
with initial values that are ±20 per cent of the Ramey-Francis data, with virtually no impact on our
predictions (the impact was too small to show on the graph below).
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the first quarter of the century is some approximate fraction of time initially allocated
to manufacturing and agricultural activities. The strength of the model will be to show
that whatever that allocation turns out to be, reasonable parameter values imply that
it virtually disappeared by the late 1920s.
As we saw, Leeds (1917) reports that in 1912-13 families in his Pennsylvania sample
spent about 5 per cent of their home work time (which included time spent by paid
assistants) making or mending clothes. They also spent smaller amounts of time on
carpentry but he does not give figures for this activity, as the number of hours reported
was too small. We could not find other pertinent data for this activity. As Leeds’ sample
was better oﬀ than the median, this may be treated as a lower bound on the fraction of
home production time devoted to making goods.
The time of home production devoted to food production is more diﬃcult to measure
and to our knowledge there is no study that gives even approximate figures. Urban
families report virtually no time spent on food production or animal care. Rural families
report some hours a week during which the housewife works on the farm, but the main
activities listed are tasks like washing milk containers and looking after small animals.
Vanek (1973) reports 10 hours a week on these activities by rural housewives but lists
them separately from home-making. This also appears to be the practice with other
researchers. In the oﬃcial statistics and in Kendrick (1961), which is the main source of
market hours used by Ramey and Francis (2006) for the early period, the hours allocated
to such activities come under “unpaid family workers” and so are included in market
hours. The Ramey-Francis home production data do not contain any hours allocated to
the growing of food and looking after animals for own consumption. In view of this we
cannot attribute part of the total home-production time that we use to the production of
agricultural substitutes, in any part of the century. As an illustration, we report below
the speed at which agricultural home production is marketized at plausible elasticity
values, but we do not include this in the main calibrations.
Elasticities of substitution. The parameter σs is the elasticity of substitution between
service and home goods. Estimates in the literature are for recent times and they are
for the elasticity of substitution between aggregate market goods and home production.
They are in the range 1.5 to 2.3 (see Rupert, Rogerson and Wright 1995, McGrattan,
Rogerson andWright 1997 and Chang and Schorfheide 2003). As in more recent times all
home production is of service goods, and in our model σs is the elasticity of substitution
between home goods and a smaller set of goods than estimated, our σs should be at least
as large as the existing estimates. We choose the biggest of these estimates, σs = 2.3.
The elasticity of substitution for manufacturing goods, σm, should be higher than
σs, on the reasonable assumption that home-produced manufacturing goods are closer
substitutes to the items that can be bought in the market than are home-produced
services. The same applies to home food production. Since there are no estimates in
the literature for these elasticities we do not venture to guess a number. Instead, for
manufacturing we select an elasticity that implies that half of all home manufacturing
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activities are marketized in about 15 years.14 Accordingly, the home manufacturing
hours found by Leeds (1917) in his 1912-13 sample would have been reduced to about
20-25 minutes per week by the late 1920s. This elasticity turns out to be σm = 5. This
appears reasonable to us in light of the estimated overall elasticities discussed in the
preceding paragraph.
For the elasticity of substitution ε we do not have direct estimates. It is clear from
(24) that in a model without home production, and because relative prices are inversely
related to relative TFP levels, the own price elasticity of the three goods is −ε. It is
also clear from (25) that in this case the slope of the regression line between changes in
relative employment levels and changes in relative prices should be 1−ε. But with home
production, and because at least some market-produced services have good substitutes
in home-produced services, the estimated price elasticity should be higher than −ε in
absolute value. Falvey and Gemmell (1996) estimate the price elasticity of the entire
service sector and they find it to be −0.3. They compare their estimate to one by
Summers (1985), which is −0.06 and not significantly diﬀerent from zero. Blundell,
Pashardes and Weber (1993) report a “services” price elasticity for Britain of −0.7.
However, they do not give a list of what services are included and since the budget share
of their services is only 0.12, it must be a very small list. Their estimate is comparable to
the estimates obtained by Falvey and Gemmell (1996) for each of their seven sub-sectors,
whose budget shares are on average of the same order of magnitude as the Blundell et
al. (1993) sector. In a model with home production, the estimate ε = 0.3 seems to be
an upper bound for the elasticity of substitution, with 0 as lower bound.
With regard to the relation between employment and price changes, we regressed
relative employment changes and relative price changes for thirteen 2-digit consumption-
goods sectors drawn from the OECD STAN database and input-output tables for 1977-
2001, and obtained an average estimate 1 − ε = 0.7.15 Given the broader aggregation
in this paper, the estimate ε = 0.3 again emerges as an upper bound for the elasticity.
Following these findings, we selected ε = 0.1 as a good guess for the benchmark elasticity
of substitution between our three sectors.
TFP growth rates. We use the link between relative prices and TFP levels to derive
the diﬀerences in TFP growth rates. They are set to match the changes in the prices of
agriculture and service goods relative to manufacturing goods. As data for service goods
are available only since 1929 we compute mean TFP growth rates for the period since
that year. We first compute annual growth rates for each year, then take the average
for the entire period. This average is 0.93 per cent for the price ratio of services to
manufacturing and −1.2 for the price ratio of agriculture to manufacturing.16
14Results are very similar if we select from a range of years, e.g., 10-20.
15These results are available in the longer version of Ngai-Pissarides (2004) that circulated as CEPR
discussion paper no. 4763 and on our personal web sites.
16Source for 1929-1970: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part
1 and 2. The implicit price deflator for services is in series E17, and the wholesale price index for
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We cannot adopt the same methodology to calibrate γsm−γsh and γmm−γmh, as there
are no estimates on the implicit price of home goods. We set as benchmark zero growth
rates in home TFP, although negative TFP growth in the home sector are consistent with
our model and with rising labour productivity, because the accumulation of consumer
durables could oﬀset it.17 We reason as follows to get the TFP growth diﬀerentials.
Given the observed rate of growth of aggregate labour productivity of 2 per cent and a
capital share of 1/3, a plausible estimate of manufacturing TFP growth is γmm = 1.33
per cent. So the benchmark value for γmm − γmh is .0133. If we subtract from γmm our
computed diﬀerence between manufacturing and services, 0.0093, we find γsm = 0.004.
Thus, γsm − γsh = 0.004 is the maximum diﬀerence consistent with non-negative TFP
growth rates for home production. Similarly, the maximum diﬀerence for γam − γah is
0.0253. These numbers are consistent with the direct estimates of Jorgenson and Gallop
(1992), who calculate an average TFP growth rate for the period 1947-85 of 2.06 per cent
for agriculture and 0.82 per cent for the private non-farm sector.18 Within their non-farm
sectors, TFP growth rates vary but the TFP growth rates for industrial sectors are in
general higher than the ones for service sectors.
Investment rate. Finally, the steady-state investment rate is η = ηm/ (1 + lsh/q) ,
where ηm is the investment (or saving) as a fraction of market production, which we
get from Maddison (1992), and lsh is the total number of hours in home production for
this period. To minimize the role of the Great Depression on the average savings rate,
we use the average of 1925-30 as an estimate for 1930, so ηm0 = 0.189. To compute η
we also need the initial home-to-market hour (lsh0/q0). We obtain this ratio from the
home and market hours data of Ramey and Francis (2006). To be consistent, we also
use the average of 1925-30 as an estimate for 1930, to obtain lsh0/q0 = 0.812. Therefore,
η = 0.104. The calibrated benchmark values are shown in Table 3.
Results. We begin by reporting the results of calibrating the full model since 1930,
when home production is entirely of services and the rest of the data are mean values for
the entire period - see figure 3. The model tracks the dynamics of employment shares
industrial commodities and farm products are in series E24-25. For 1970-2000, see Economic Report of
the President, Tables B-62 and B-67. The measurement of both prices and TFP, especially in the earlier
period, is fraught with diﬃculties, so we use the same TFP diﬀerences for the whole period, rather than
looking at diﬀerent sub-periods, even though our balanced growth path allows γsm and γam to change
over time.
17Consider service productivity. The capital-labour ratio in home production is k, the same as in the
market, and so it grows at positive rate γmm/(1− α). “Real” labour productivity in home production
is Ashkα, which grows at rate αγmm/(1 − α) + γsh, so a negative γsh is consistent with positive rate
of growth of real labour productivity. Of course, as in the other sectors, the value of average product
in the home sector (with manufacturing as numeraire) grows at rate γmm and the implicit price of
home-produced goods rises at rate γmm − γsh.
18The numbers are obtained from adding the productivity growth rates due to input quality adjust-
ment from Table 4 to the TFP growth rates in Table 1, 1.58 for agriculture and 0.44 for the non-farm
sector.
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Table 3: Baseline Parameters, United States, 1930-2004
η σs ε γmm−γma γmm−γsm γam − γah γmm − γmh γsm − γsh
0.104 2.3 0.1 −0.012 0.0093 0.0253∗ 0.0133∗ 0.004
*These numbers are shown here because they are derived from post-1929 data but they are not used in
the calibration for the 1930-2004 period. See the text for more details
very well, picking up the fast rise of service employment and the fall in agricultural
employment, with smaller changes in manufacturing. In 2000, the employment shares
for agriculture, manufacturing and services were 0.02, 0.25 and 0.73 respectively. The
model predicts 0.06, 0.29 and 0.65: given the initial distribution of 0.21, 0.36 and 0.43,
there is a lot of predictive power in the model. With respect to total market hours, the
model generates a very shallow U-shape when compared to the data. Not surprisingly, it
does not track the changes in hours in the Great Depression and the war, but it picks up
the downward trend up to the mid 1970s and the rise in the last quarter century. In 1930
hours of work per capita were 18.5 per week. In 1961-65, when on this definition hours
reached their lowest point, they were on average 16.53 per week. The model predicts a
fall to 17.9 hours (with a minimum just below this number reached in the 1970s). By
1995-04, hours of work increased back to 18.7 per week, and the model predicts 18.1
hours per week. As we pointed out, predicting the turning point as part of the same
dynamic process that predicts the structural transformation is unique to our model, but
it is clear from the results that the productivity explanation is not the only explanation
for the observed low-frequency fluctuations in hours of work.
Raising σs in these calculations reduces the fall in hours but increases the subsequent
rise. More interestingly, given the uncertainty attached to the TFP calculations, we
calculated results also for a lower relative manufacturing price. We chose manufacturing
because market prices for manufactures may not reflect accurately the improvement in
quality. We set the TFP growth diﬀerential between agriculture and manufacturing to
0.0053 and the growth diﬀerential between manufacturing and services to 0.016 (i.e., we
lowered manufacturing relative prices by 0.7 percentage points). The sectoral predictions
improve further - the predicted distribution in 2000 now is 0.06, 0.26 and 0.68. With
respect to overall hours, the fall in the 1970s is now down to 17.6 hours per week, which
is closer to the actual fall, but the rise at the end of the sample is only up to 17.8 hours.
For the period before 1930 we do not have enough data to do a full calibration. For
home production we have the interpolations done by Ramey and Francis (2006) for over-
all hours in home production and the number given by Leeds (1917) for manufacturing-
like tasks in 1912-13. As we argued, the published data do not distinguish agricultural
home production from unpaid family workers, so we set the home production of agri-
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culture in 1900 to zero. For manufacturing we choose an initial value of 10 per cent
of all home production. At the elasticity value of σm = 5 this gives just over 5 per
cent in 1912-13, which is consistent with the fraction reported by Leeds. All the other
parameters are as in the post-1929 calibration. The results are shown in figure 4. We
show results for 1900-1929, as the subsequent period is exactly as in figure 3, conditional
on the initial distribution of hours. The main new component in these predictions is the
marketization of manufacturing, which moved labour time from the home to the market.
As shown in figure 4, marketization of manufacturing is virtually complete by 1930,
which is what we targeted with σm = 5. In the data the distribution of the market shares
is 0.21, 0.36 and 0.43 respectively for agriculture, manufacturing and services, and we
predict 0.23, 0.39 and 0.37, which is close. Our predictions are even closer for the lower
relative manufacturing price (respectively, 0.24, 0.37 and 0.39).19 With respect to total
market hours, the model predicts a fall of about 0.5 hours between 1900 and 1929. It
is diﬃcult to get an underlying trend for market hours at this time, as the filtered data
that we show increase first because of the war (in the unfiltered data hours are flat until
the war years) and then fall in anticipation of the Great Depression (the unfiltered data
are virtually flat in the 1920s). Given these problems, it might be more appropriate to
evaluate the performance of the model by comparing its predictions with the average
number of hours before the war and before the Great Depression. The average number
of hours in the unfiltered data for 1900-04 is 21.6 and for 1925-09 it is 20.85, giving a
fall of 0.75 hours. This compares favourably with the model’s predicted 0.5 hour fall.
In the equations underlying figure 4 the decline of manufacturing home production is
driven by the product of the elasticity of substitution σm and the TFP growth diﬀerential
between market and home. A higher elasticity gives faster marketization and can oﬀset
the structural transformation force completely, to give a small rise in overall market
hours. When manufacturing home production is a bigger share of total hours than we
calculate it to be at the beginning of the 20th century, this marketization force may
explain a rise in hours of work, as some economic historians have claimed for the very
early stages of industrialization.
Reasoning along similar lines, had data for agricultural home production been avail-
able, the model would have predicted an even faster decline of home-produced agricul-
tural goods, because of the bigger TFP growth diﬀerential for agriculture. If we apply
the same elasticity of substitution for agriculture, σa = 5, which is not unreasonable
given how similar home-grown food is to food bought in the market, we would get a
half life for agricultural home hours of about 7 to 8 years instead of manufacturing’s 15
years.
19For this period we have only four data points for sectoral shares, with a diﬀerence of 10 years
between adjacent points, which we join up in figure 4.
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4 More on the economics of leisure
We have treated non-work time so far as in conventional growth and real business cycle
models, as leisure time that yields utility directly, without the help of any goods. But
a large amount of leisure in time use surveys is enjoyed with the use of some capital or
intermediate goods, such as watching TV, surfing the net or talking on the telephone.
We generalize our benchmark model by introducing a leisure good cl that is produced
mostly at home using time and capital goods.20 One important outcome of this extension
is that now changes in leisure time can also cause changes in labour supply, even if the
economy is on a balanced growth path.
We assume that leisure is of two types, one as in the benchmark model and one that is
the output of a “production” process that uses capital and labour through a production
function that is identical to the one for other goods. We use subscript l for leisure-
goods production and let Al denote its TFP level. We assume that the leisure good (say
TV viewing services) is a better substitute for service goods than it is for agricultural
and manufacturing goods. But it is not as good a substitute for market services as
home production is. This is the main feature that diﬀerentiates home production from
leisure production. Home production such as cooked food has market-produced close
substitutes but leisure production such as TV viewing does not have close substitutes
in the market; if an individual hires somebody to do her TV viewing for her the end
product will not be a close substitute to watching the TV herself. Yet both cooked
food and TV viewing are produced at home with some durable good purchased from the
manufacturing sector.
Formally, we assume that the services aggregate now consists of three goods, market
services and home production as before, combined into cs as in the benchmark model,
and leisure goods, which are combined with cs into a grand service good, cS. We want
the elasticity of substitution between cs and cl to be bigger than the one between service
goods and manufacturing goods (our ε) but smaller than the elasticity of substitution
between market and home produced services (our σs).We choose it to be 1, which gives
a particularly simple and appealing result on the dynamics of leisure time. But the
model also has a solution if the elasticity is bigger or smaller than one.
The utility of goods now is,
φ (.) =
³P
ωjc
(ε−1)/ε
j
´ε/(ε−1)
j = a,m, S; cS = c1−ξs c
ξ
l , (42)
20In time use surveys by far the dominant good of the kind that we have in mind is watching TV.
See below in this section for some data. Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2005) also put forward the
idea that the dynamics of leisure time are influenced by the complementarities between durables and
time. Their approach, however, is diﬀerent from ours. They claim that leisure has increased because
the quality and variety of goods like TV, which are complementary to leisure time, has gone up. Our
claim runs along the lines of our previous discussion, people consume more time watching TV and doing
other similar things because technological progress elsewhere has increased their consumption of other
goods and other goods are poor substitutes for TV watching time.
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with cs defined as before, as a CES between csm and csh with elasticity σs. This specifi-
cation reduces to the benchmark model when ξ → 0. The marketization conditions (15)
still hold between the market and home production of service goods. By direct extension
a similar condition holds between the service composite cs and leisure production cl :
ll
ls
=
ξ
1− ξ . (43)
This is an important result that is due to our unit elasticity assumption for cs and cl :
the ratio of leisure-production time to service-production time is a constant. The size of
the constant depends on the parameter ξ. It should be obvious and it is straightforward
to show that all the other results of the benchmark model still hold, with the composite
cS replacing cs. The composite cS now has two “marketization” forces beneath it, the
one between market production and home production which holds as before, and the
one between leisure and the other two service sectors, given by (43). The aggregates
(consumption, income and capital stock) are still defined as before and a balanced growth
path with constant capital-output ratio exists. The new element is that on this steady
state total leisure is now defined as (1 − l) + ll, and it is not constant because of the
dynamics of ll.
As in the benchmark model and for as long as TFP growth in agriculture and man-
ufacturing exceed TFP growth in the service sectors, service employment is monoton-
ically increasing over time. With ls increasing over time, we get from (43) that ll is
also monotonically increasing over time. Thus, total leisure time, 1 − l + ll, is increas-
ing over time, with l constant on the balanced growth path and ll rising. We address
two questions about this dynamic. First, how big is the share of leisure in time use
surveys now and how big is it in the asymptotic state? This will give an idea of the
dynamics involved. Second, what happens to overall labour supply when there is leisure
production?
The answer to the first question depends mainly on the preference parameter ξ.
This is because both the current and asymptotic ll are a constant fraction ξ/(1 − ξ)
of service employment. In the American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) of 2003 and 2004
there is a fairly detailed breakdown of the activities in which people engage in their
leisure time. We include under our leisure production TV watching, sports participation
and telephone, mail and email and we find that individuals over the age of 15 spend
about 21 hours a week in these activities. Total leisure time is about 39 hours and
total work time (market and home) 50 hours.21 Making use of the data on home and
market production from the same surveys we get an approximate value of ξ = 1/3. In the
asymptotic steady state our model prediction (on the assumption that the time devoted
to the other activities mentioned in the preceding footnote remains the same) is that
21The remainder is spent on essential activities like sleep, 74 hours, education, 3.5 hours and unclas-
sified items, 1.5 hours.
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total work converges to 44 hours and total leisure time to 45 hours. So the prediction is
that once the structural transformation and marketization forces run their course, there
will be a net shift of 6 hours a week from work to leisure activities. It is also predicted
that the shift will take a very long time to complete because of the small diﬀerentials in
the TFP growth rates.
Labour supply with leisure production is q = l − lh − ll. Since home production
converges to zero and leisure converges to a constant, labour supply must also converge
to a constant. Leisure is rising throughout the adjustment to the asymptotic steady
state, whereas we have argued that the structural transformation and marketization
forces that drive labour supply in the benchmark first lower labour supply and then
increase it. So with leisure production the predicted initial fall in labour supply is faster
and due to both the rise in leisure and the rise in home production, whereas in the second
phase, when labour supply increases, the rise would be mitigated. Two forces are acting
against each other in the second phase, the marketization of home production pushes for
a rise in labour supply and the rise in leisure for a fall. With the parameter values used
in our benchmark calibrations and ξ set equal to 1/3, the marketization force dominates
and labour supply is on a very slowly increasing trend.22
5 Conclusions
We have shown that a unified framework can simultaneously account for structural
change between agriculture, industry and services and a changing trend in aggregate
hours of work without violating balanced aggregate growth. Our prediction of the co-
existence of a changing trend in hours on the one hand and balanced aggregate growth
on the other is new to a model of economic growth. The assumptions that drive our
results are (a) market goods are poor substitutes with each other but home-produced
goods have close substitutes in the market, and (b) agriculture and industry have higher
rates of total factor productivity growth than do services, but within each sector market
production has higher rate of TFP growth than home production. On the aggregate
economy’s balanced growth path the dynamics of aggregate market hours are driven by
the dynamics of home production, but oﬀ the steady state there are transitional dynam-
ics with leisure time rising and the supply of labour falling. We have also shown that an
extension which refines the use of leisure time and pays attention to the fact that most
leisure time is spent with some capital good, such as a TV set, has the implication that
leisure time is also rising over time on the balanced growth path.
The qualitative predictions of our model are consistent with the dynamics of hours
of work in the United States. Quantitative analysis shows that the model matches
well the dynamics of employment shares since 1900 and reasonably well the aggregate
22This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion of Aguiar and Hurst (2005), who find that in
recent surveys the fall in home production time has been matched mainly by a rise in leisure time.
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dynamics. In particular, we explain a fall in market hours up to the 1970s and a rise
since then. The recent rise of female employment is consistent with the marketization
of home production emphasized in this paper. Of course, this is not to suggest that no
other factor has contributed to the explanation of the dynamics of market hours of work.
We abstracted from international trade and all distortions to competitive market al-
locations. Distortions can influence the allocation of time between market and home and
trade aﬀects manufacturing and services diﬀerently, so it is likely to influence structural
change. European data show the same general patterns for market hours of work as
in the United States, but more recently with some delay in the marketization of home
production. We did not discuss in any detail reasons for these diﬀerences; taxation,
regulation such as restrictions in weekly hours of work and in shop opening times and
trade are likely to prove important in accounting for these diﬀerences. Future work
needs to enrich the technological explanation of trends that we have emphasized in this
paper with the introduction of taxes, regulation and international trade, especially if
cross-country diﬀerences are to be successfully explained (see Freeman and Schettkat,
2005, Prescott, 2004, Rogerson, 2004, and Messina, 2005, for related work).
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HP filtered data. All filtered data in this and subsequent graphs uses a smoothing parameter of 100.
Sources:   Total hours, Groningen Growth and Development Centre
Working age population, OECD
Working age population, OECD
Definitions:Market Hours is total market hours divided by the population aged 10+ (right scale)
Agriculture includes agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, utilities, transportation and communication and
 services all others (left scale)
Source: Market Hours, Ramey and Francis (2006), HP filtered
Employment shares: Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1929-2004 and 
Historical Statistics for the United States for 1899, 1909, 1919.
The graph is plotted by interpolation between the data points.
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Model predictions, 1930-2004
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Model predictions, 1900-1929
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925
Sh
ar
es
0
5
10
15
20
W
ee
kl
y 
H
ou
rs
market hours
services
manufacturing
agriculture
market hours
services
manufacturing
agriculture
manufacturing home
